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In the 
Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
HOWARD F. SEYBOLD, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
UNION pACIFIC RAILROAD COM- I 
P ANY, a corporation, J. 
Defendant and Respondent. • 
Case No. 
7641 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
The parties will be referred to herein as they ap-
peared in the lower court. Figures in parenthesis are the 
page number of the record. 
The statement of facts in the plaintiff's brief is ac-
cepted by the defendant, except that it is incomplete. Ac-
tually, we believe that a full understanding of the evidence 
in this case can be arrived at only by reading the entire 
record. A brief statement of the facts is in this case of 
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questionable assistance and might be misleading. On page 
8 of their brief counsel for the plaintiff state that the 
defendant introduced "the usual railroad evidence." Again 
on page 9 of their brief counsel state: "The railroad tes-
timony here was just a little too good to be believed 
* * * ." Counsel apparently infer that the defendant 
fabricated its defense. We can readily agree with them 
that no reasonable person could read the entire record and 
not conclude that one side or the other in this case pre-
sented testimony which was false. The discrepancies be-
tween the plaintiff's testimony and that of the six wit-
nesses for the defendant are such that they just can't be 
explained on the basis of honest mistakes. It is true that 
the jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff and against 
the defendant; but we believe that an examination of the 
complete record will disclose to any reasonable person that 
the jury did so not because they believed or could have 
believed the plaintiff's testimony, but rather in spite of 
their disbelief of that testimony. It is true, also, that the 
law recognizes that the testimony of a single interested 
witness might be entitled to belief against the contrary 
testimony of a dozen or more disinterested witnesses. That 
rule has no application, however, where the testimony of 
the single witness is so unlikely and so contrary to the 
great weight of the evidence and the physical facts and 
the general experience of mankind as to be unworthy of 
belief. If the trial court granted the defendant's motion for 
judgment notwithstanding the jury's verdict because it 
concluded that no reasonable jury could possibly believe 
the defendant's testimony, such a conclusion would be jus-
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tified. The rules of law concerning the conduct of a trial 
are neither so technical nor so strict as to leave the trial 
court helpless before an unjust verdict. 
Counsel for the plaintiff in effect charge the defen-
dant with permitting and encouraging, if not participating 
in, criminal conduct before the trial court. Such a charge 
cannot remain unchallenged. It emphasizes the need for 
a careful scrutiny of the entire record in order that the 
Supreme Court may itself evaluate the worth of the con-
flicting evidence. The following facts not adequately cov-
ered by counsel for the plaintiff in their brief are worthy 
of emphasis, although they, too, are insufficient to present 
a complete picture of the evidence. 
The main portion of the town of Roberts, where the 
railroad crossing in question is located, is on Highway 91, 
which highway was parallel to and 79 feet distant from 
the defendant's Team Track and 122 feet from the Passing 
Track (37, 127). The flasher signal where the plaintiff 
claims he stopped his truck is 15 feet west from the center 
of the Team Track ( 127) . There were several electric 
lights burning on the various stores fronting Highway 91 
(38, 128-130). There was an arc light burning just south 
of the crossing ( 128). There was a second arc light burn-
ing east of Highway 91 between the highway and the Team 
Track and about 300 feet north of the crossing ( 129) . The 
trackage area in defendant's yards at Roberts was visible 
from the sidewalk on the west side of Highway 91 (143, 
130). The following witnesses testified there was a light 
on the front of the caboose which collided with the truck 
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plaintiff was driving: Enos Ray, Conductor, who was 
standing on the crossing and had a clear view of the ca-
boose as it approached (63, 64) ; Gerald Sullivan, Engi-
neer, who was in the cab of the defendant's engine and 
saw lights on the caboose when it was kicked down toward 
the crossing (101); Howard Kunze, Brakeman, who testi-
fied he was riding on the front or sopth end of the caboose, 
and who stated there were marker lights on the southwest 
corner thereof and that he himself carried an electric lan-
tern which he was waving (112, 114, 121) ; George Dutson, 
who was working in a store on the west side of Highway 
91 (136, 137); and Joe Tirre, who was standing on the 
sidewalk between a tavern and a hotel on the west side 
of Highway 91 (143). The plaintiff testified on direct 
examination that he approached the railroad crossing, saw 
the flasher lights operating, observed the engine north of 
the crossing on the main line track, concluded this engine 
was making the flasher . signals operate and so proceeded 
over the crossing, keeping his eyes on the engine and the 
road ahead (20). He saw the caboose at a glance only for 
not more than a second before the collision and he did not 
notice any lights on it (21). On cross examination he testi-
fied he knew there were three tracks at this crossing; did 
not look north along the Team Track as he proceeded over 
this track; did look to the north along the Passing Track, 
but the locomotive headlight was flashing across the cross-
ing and he did not see anything ( 39) . He further testified 
there was no man on the caboose, although he did not have 
time to make proper observation since his first and only 
glance at the caboose was when it was 6 or 7 feet away 
and he had to look awfully fast (39, 40). 
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THE PLAINTIFF WAS GUILTY OF CONTRIB-
UTORY NEGLIGENCE AS A MATTER OF 
LAW. 
The plaintiff's evidence with respect to the alleged 
negligence on the part of the defendant \Vas so meager and 
speculative, and the defendant's evidence to the contrary 
was so overwhelming, that we feel the trial court would 
probably have been justified in granting the defendant's 
motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict because 
of a failure of proof on this issue, alone. However, the 
defendant does not now rely upon the plaintiff's failure 
to prove that defendant was negligent, nor do we believe 
the trial court relied upon such a failure of proof in grant-
ing judgment to the defendant. The controlling issue in 
this case-the one which we believe prompted the court 
to grant its judgment notwithstanding the verdict, and the 
only issue that need be analyzed to demonstrate the cor-
rectness of the court's action-is the question of the plain-
tiff's contributory negligence. Therefore, without conced-
ing the validity of the plaintiff's argument with respect 
to the defendant's negligence, we shall confine this. brief 
to a consideration of the plaintiff's own negligence which 
was a contributing cause of this crossing accident, if not 
the sole cause thereof. 
In our analysis of this issue we accept, of course, the 
fundamental rule asserted by counsel for the plaintiff that 
on this appeal the evidence must be viewed in the light 
most favorable to the plaintiff. However, to this rule must 
be added the equally elementary qualification that it is ap-
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plicable only as to conflicting evidence which creates a 
question to be resolved by the jury. 
The plaintiff's conduct must be analyzed in the light 
of all the circumstances. It appears to us there are only 
three possible views that anyone can take as to the facts 
revealed by the evidence in this case. The circumstances 
surrounding the accident might have been such as dis-
closed by the overwhelming evidence introduced by the 
defendant; the circumstances might have been such as dis-
closed by the plaintiff's evidence ; or the circumstances might 
have been as related by the plaintiff, except only as to his 
testimony that there were no lights on the defendant's ca-
boose. Analysis of the plaintiff's conduct separately in the 
light of each of these three possible views with respect to 
the circumstances of the accident will lead to the same 
conclusion-that the plaintiff was guilty of contributory 
negligence as a matter of law. 
A. The Plaintiff was Guilty of Contributory Negli-
gence as a Matter of Law if the Evidence of the Defend-
ant was True. 
Several witnesses testified that the crossing where 
this accident occurred was well lighted and the flasher 
warning signal was operating; that the defendant's engine 
was more than 400 feet north of the crossing; that there 
were lights on the caboose and one of defendant's employes 
was standing on the leading platform of the caboose wav-
ing a lighted lantern in his hand and yelling to warn the 
plaintiff; that another of defendant's employes was stand-
ing on the crossing with a lantern in his hand which he 
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was waving at the plaintiff; and finally, that the plaintiff 
failed to see or ignored all of these warnings but proceeded 
heedlessly over the crossing and into collision with the ca-
boose. If plaintiff's conduct is measured in the light of 
such evidence, it is clear that he failed to satisfy the stan-
dard of care which the law imposed upon him. This is so 
clear as to obviate citation of authorities or further analy-
sis. 
In the event the court feels the defendant is not en-
titled to have its evidence considered to the exclusion of 
that presented by the plaintiff, it will be necessary to 
analyze the plaintiff's conduct in the light of the other 
two possible views of the evidence. 
B. Plaintiff Was Guilty of Contributory Negligence 
as a Matter of Law if the Evidence of the Plaintiff is Ac-
cepted as True, Save Only as Plaintiff Testified there were 
No Lights on the Caboose. 
We believe this view of the evidence, which is the third 
possibility mentioned above, was the one which was. taken 
by the trial court. We believe that it is the view which 
should be taken by the Supreme Court on this appeal. The 
plaintiff testified there were no lights on the front end 
of the caboose. But even if all of the plaintiff's other tes-
timony is accepted as true, this statement should be re-
jected because plaintiff's limited opportunity. for observa~ 
tion and his mental attitude at the moment of observation 
render it insufficient to raise a conflict with the testimony 
of defendant's witnesses that the caboose was lighted. 
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This argument involves consideration of the law with 
respect to the sufficiency of negative testimony. Of course, 
negative testimony should not be disregarded merely be-
cause it is negative. Frequently, there is no way for a 
plaintiff in a negligence action to prove his case except 
by negative testimony, since proof of negligence often in-
volves proof of a negative. It is nonetheless true that such 
evidence must be accepted with caution; that while the 
jury has the function of determining its weight, still it is 
for the court first to determine its sufficiency; and that 
rather definite standards have been established in this jur-
isdiction and elsewhere to test such sufficiency. It is the 
defendant's position that the trial court should have and 
did determine that the plaintiff's testimony failed to meet 
such standards and could not therefore be considered to 
raise a dispute as to the fact in this regard. 
Most of the cases dealing with this subject involve the 
question as to whether or not audible signals were given. 
In principle, however, such cases are identical with the 
present one. Each involves the reliability of human sensory 
perception-in one case the reliability of the ear, and in 
the other, that of the eyes. 
In Russell v. Watkins, 49 Utah 598, 164 P. 867, the 
Utah court, apparently for the first time, announced its 
position with respect to sufficiency of negative testimony. 
In this case, plaintiff, riding a motorcycle, approached a 
horse and wagon traveling in the opposite direction. The 
defendant was driving an automobile behind the wagon. 
He turned out to pass the wagon and collided head on with 
plaintiff's motorcycle. Both plaintiff and the driver of the 
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wagon testified defendant did not blow his horn. The court 
held that the defendant's positive testimony that he did 
blow his horn was uncontradicted. We quote what we be-
lieve to be the pertinent portion of the court's opinion: 
"* * * When we take into consideration that 
the plaintiff, according to his own testimony, was 
at the time without thought and wholly unaware of 
the approach of defendant's automobile, that he was 
seated on a motorcycle moving at the rate of 15 to 
20 miles per hour, that his view of the traveled road 
was obscured by Bryson's approaching wagon and 
horses, and of necessity had to cross immediately to 
the east side of the highway for safety and in pass-
ing the Bryson vehicle, and that the witness Bryson 
was, at the same time, apprehensively riveting his 
attention on the motorcycle approaching him, on ac-
count of his own safety, and through fear of the 
horse he was driving making him trouble, we may 
well believe these witnesses 'did not hear' the horn 
sounded by the defendant on his approach. 
"The weight of negative testimony of witnesses, 
as to the giving of signals, ordinarily is for the jury 
to determine; but when physical conditions and the 
attending circumstances are such as to render it 
highly improbable that they could hear, we think 
the rule should be and is otherwise." (Italics ours.) 
In Jensen v. Oregon Short Line R. Co., 59 Utah 367, 
204 P. 101, there was negative testimony that no warning 
bell was rung by defendant's engine. This testimony was 
from a boy standing near the track, alongside the deceased. 
He and the deceased had their attention directed to another 
engine approaching from the opposite direction. The court 
held that this evidence did not present a conflict with posi-
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tive evidence that the bell was ringing and the whistle 
blowing, and stated as follows: 
"This is not a case in which the witness claims 
to have been listening for signals and failed to hear 
them. The witness in this case was not consciously 
listening at all. His attention was directed in an-
other direction, and his mind was engrossed with 
other matters. Besides this, the freight train to 
which his attention was directed was pulling up-
grade and making considerable noise .. In view of all 
of these circumstances and conditions, it cannot be 
contended that the testimony of the witness Priest 
to the effect that he did not hear the bell rung or 
the whistle blow can be considered as evidence at all 
that the bell did not ring or that the whistle did not 
blow * * *" 
"In the face of such evidence as this, together 
with the conditions and circum~stances heretofore 
enumerated, the writer is of the opinion that the 
statement of the witness. Priest that he did not hear 
the whistle blow or the bell ring created no conflict 
in the evidence, and that therefore the testimony of 
defendant's witnesses. as to the warning given stands 
uncontradicted and unimpeached * * * " 
The subject is again treated by the Utah court in An-
derson v. Union Pacific R. Co., 76 Utah 324, 289 P. 146, 
wherein the court announced the following standard in 
measuring the sufficiency of negative testimony that no 
whistle was sounded or bell rung: 
"* * * T'o entitle negative testimony such 
as that of Reddon and Thompson affecting the ring-
ing of the bell and blowing of the whistle on the 
occasion in question to any probative value, it must 
be made to appear that they were paying some at-
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tention to what actually occurred and that they were 
in a position where they could and did observe what 
was done or what was not done * * * ." 
And in Clark, et al., v. Union Pacific, et al., 70 Utah 
29, 257 P. 1050, the rule \Vas announced in the following 
words: 
"* * * Though a witness was not specially 
listening for the signals, or giving special attention 
to the occurrence, yet, if his attention was not en-
grossed or devoted to other things, and it being made 
to appear that he was in position to hea.r, and in all 
likelihood ~vould have heard them had they been 
given, his testimony that he heard none is still of 
probative value and is not to be disregarded, though 
its weight be not regarded as great as the testimony 
of a witness who testified that he was specially 
watching and listening for signals, and heard none, 
or of a witness that they were or were not given 
* * * ." (Italics ours.) 
Finally, in Hudson v. Union Pac. R. Co. (not yet re-
ported), the court concluded that the plaintiff's negative 
testimony that no bell was rung and no whistle blown was 
sufficient to create a conflict for the following reason, and 
we quote from the court's opinion : 
"* * * Mrs. Hudson was in a position where 
it is likely that she would have heard the whistle 
or at least the bell, and, as there is no evidence that 
her attention was so absorbed in other matters that 
she would not have heard, a jury question is pre-
sented." (Italics ours.) 
In Bergman v. Northern Pac. Ry. Co., 14 F. 2d 580, 
which is an opinion from the Eighth Circuit Court of Ap-
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peals, two witnesses to a fatal railroad crossing accident 
were in an automobile on the opposite side of the railroad 
crossing and came to a stop at the crossing just as the train 
passed. The weather was stormy, snow was falling, and 
the wind was blowing so that the sound of a whistle or bell 
would be carried away from these witnesses. The court, in 
holding that the testimony of these two witnesses presented 
no conflict with positive testimony that the crossing signals 
were given, stated as follows: 
"* * * The applicable rule, well established 
by the authorities, is that, where the attention of 
those testifying to a negative was not attracted to 
the occurrence which they say they did not see or 
hear, and where their situation was not such that 
they probably would have observed it, their testi-
mony is not inconsistent with that of credible· wit-
nesses who were in a situation favorable for obser-
vation and who testify affirmatively and positively 
to the occurrence * * *." (Italics ours.) 
To the same effect see Pere Marquette Ry. Co. v. Anderson, 
29 F. 2d 479. 
Miller v. Abel Construction Co., 140 Neb. 482, 300 N. 
W. 405, is a case in which the facts are quite similar to 
the case at bar. In that case, plaintiff was riding in an 
automobile being driven by her husband when it crashed 
into a road roller being operated by one of defendant's em-
ployes. Plaintiff and her husband testified that the de-
fendant failed to have a red light displayed on the rear 
of the roller. As the automobile in which the plaintiff and 
her husband were riding approached the roller, at night-
time, they passed another car traveling in the opposite 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
13 
direction, and the driver of each automobile dimmed his 
headlights. Immediately on passing this automobile, plain-
tiff and her husband saw the roller for the first time, 10 
or 15 feet in front of them. The court held that the testi-
mony of plaintiff and her husband that there was no light 
on the roller raised no conflict with positive testimony that 
a red light was displayed. We quote from the court's de-
cision in this case: 
"The defendant's witnesses * * * testified 
positively that the red lantern on the roller was 
lighted prior to the collision. In the face of this 
positive testimony that the red light was displayed, 
the fact that there is testimony of one or more wit-
nesses that they did not see it will not prevail against 
the positive testimony of several witnesses in making 
an issuable fact for the jury, where the attention of 
the witnesses ~vas not directed toward the red light 
at the time it is said to have been displayed, and 
where their position, mental condition, and the sur-
roundings were not such as would raise a presump-
tion that they would have seen it· if it had been dis-
played * * *." (Italics ours.) 
In Allison v. Boston & M. R., 88 N. H. 420, 190 A. 127, 
defendant produced no positive testimony that the crossing 
signals were given by its train crew. In this case, the ac-
cident occurred at a crossing on a foggy morning, and the 
plaintiff testified he did not hear any warning signal, nor 
did he see the defendant's train until an instant before 
the impact, when he saw a "black flash." The court held 
that, even though there was no positive evidence that the 
proper warning signals were given, the plaintiff's negative 
testimony was not sufficient to create a jury question on 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
14 
the issue of warning signals because his testimony amounted 
to no more than a scintilla and provided no sufficient basis 
for a verdict. The court held that the burden of proving 
absence of warning signals rested upon the plaintiffs and 
that they had failed to adduce any legally sufficient evi-
dence in support thereof. 
Markusfeld v. Zahn (Tex.), 99 S. W. 2d 438, is also 
a case in which the facts are somewhat similar to the pres-
ent one. Here the plaintiff and other witnesses, who were 
riding in plaintiff's automobile, testified that they did not 
see any clearance light on the defendant's truck as it ap-
proached them. It appeared, however, that plaintiff and 
his witnesses were blinded by the headlights of the de-
fendant's truck as it approached. The court held their 
testimony that they sa.w no clearing light presented no 
jury question, in the face of positive testimony that there 
was such a light on the truck and that the finding of the 
jury that the defendant's truck did not have a front clear-
ance light was so against the great weight and preponder-
ance of the evidence as to be clearly wrong. 
Wigmore states that before negative testimony can be 
accepted it must be made to appear that the witness was 
so situated that "in the ordinary course of events he would 
have heard or seen the fact had it occurred." Wign~ore on 
Evidence, Third Edition, page 778. 
If we measure plaintiff's testimony In this case by 
the standards set forth in the above cases, it becomes. clear 
that it is insufficient to create a conflict with the defen-
dant's positive evidence that the lights on the caboose were 
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burning. Plaintiff did not see the caboose at all at the time 
he claims to have stopped on the west side of the tracks. 
He testified the headlight of the locomotive flashed across 
the crossing, and he could not see anything down the Pass-
ing Track. He saw the caboose just momentarily, not more 
than a second before the collision. He wasn't looking for 
the caboose and wasn't expecting it. His eyes and his at-
tention were directed to the stationary engine and the road 
ahead. He didn't have an opportunity to look for details. 
To him it was a large object, and nothing more, as he looked 
up and caught a fleeting momentary glance a g.econd be-
fore the impact. One moment the plaintiff was proceeding 
over the crossing, not looking down the Passing Track, en-
tirely unapprehensive as to any approaching object. The 
next moment he was rendered unconscious or dazed by the 
shock of the impact; and in the intervening second plaintiff 
had the fleeting glance upon which he bases his negative 
testimony. It was for the trial court to determine whether 
or not he had sustained the burden of showing that it was 
likely, or that it was probable, or that in the ordinary course 
of events he would see and remember that there were no 
lights on the front of the caboose. It would have been im-
proper for the court to submit this question to the jury-
just as improper as it would be for a trial court to submit 
to a jury the preliminary legal question as to the compe-
tency of offered testimony. If in granting the defendant's 
motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict the court 
decided this question against the plaintiff, it cannot be 
said the trial court committed reversible error. This nega-
tive testimony offered by the plaintiff rests upon obser-
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vation so nebulous as to preclude the possibility that plain-
tiff saw and remembered the details of the caboose so that 
he could speak authoritatively thereon. We submit that 
the plaintiff did not sustain the burden of establishing the 
sufficiency of his negative testimony and that there is 
therefore no evidence which conflicts with the positive 
testimony of defendant's several witnesses that lights were 
burning on the front end of the caboose. 
We proceed, then, to consider the plaintiff's conduct 
from this view of the evidence. A brief review of plain-
tiff's testimony and of the defendant's undisputed evidence 
will .be helpful in this analysis. 
Plaintiff testified he knew there were three tracks at 
this crossing. He saw the flasher signal working and 
stopped at the signal. l-Ie did not look down the Team 
Track; he did look down the Passing T·rack but could see 
nothing. The locomotive headlight was flashing across the 
crossing. The only inference from this testimony is that 
he was trying to say and did say that he did not see the 
approaching caboose because the locomotive headlight ob-
scured his vision. Nonetheless, he proceeded across· the 
tracks, keeping his eyes on the stationary engine and the 
road ahead. The caboose and the trackage area were both 
visible to persons on the west side of Highway 91. The 
caboose was visible to the plaintiff as he proceeded down 
Highway 91 toward the crossing, had he but looked effec-
tively then. It was visible to him as he turned at the ap-
proach to the crossing. Accepting the evidence most fav-
orable to the plaintiff, it would have been visible to him 
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at the crossing except for the fact that the flashing loco-
motive headlights obscured his vision. 
A motorist's duty when approaching a railroad cross-
ing which he knows is there, and over which he knows 
trains operate, extends further than merely looking up and 
down the tracks and listening for approaching trains. It 
is his duty to look in such a manner and from such a po-
sition as to make his observation effective. In this case the 
plaintiff proceeded blindly over the crossing, not knowing 
whether it was safe to do so, or not. Unable to determine 
without further effort if a train was approaching along 
the Passing Track, the plaintiff took a chance and pro-
ceeded blindly across. After his first ineffective look down 
the Passing Track, he did not even look down that track 
again as he moved toward it but proceeded to and over the 
Team Track and across the 45 feet between the T:eam Track 
and the Passing Track, keeping his eyes on the engine and 
the road ahead. Plaintiff negligently took a chance and this 
chance resulted in the accident. He cannot hold the de-
fendant for injuries thus sustained. As was simply and 
succinctly stated by an early New Jersey court in Central 
R. Co. v. SmaUey, 61 N. J. L. 277, 39 A. 695: 
"The duty of a person who is about to cross a 
railroad track is to be prudent, to look and to listen, 
and to do the things that will make looking and lis-
tening reasonably effective. If the vision or hearing 
of such a person is limited by permanent obstruc-
tions or disturbances, he should for that reason be 
cautious. If his vision or hearing is limited by tran-
sient obstructions or disturbances, under circum-
stances which oblige him to rely on the sense thus 
limited, he should wait until it has again become 
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efficient to warn him of peril * * * To go on 
a railroad crossing in the way of a train which can 
be neither seen or heard, but which would he either 
visible or audible except for some temporary hin-
drance to sight or hearing, is to he negligent." 
In Bates v. San Pedro, L. A. & S. L. R. Co., 38 Utah 
568, 114 P. 527, the plaintiff drove a horse and buggy 
along a highway which paralleled the defendant's tracks 
for some distance, and then turned to the right at a cross-
ing to pass over this. track. He slowed up about 50 feet 
from ·the track and glanced in the direction from which 
the train approached but his view from that point was 
partially obstructed by an embankment. He then moved 
over the crossing without again looking in that direction 
and was struck by defendant's train. The court held that 
he was negligent as a matter of law, and in its opinion 
quotes Elliott on Railroads, Volume 3, Second Edition, para-
graph 166, as follows: 
"The duty to look and listen requires the trav-
eler to exercise care to select a position from which 
an effective observation can be made. The mere fact 
of looking and listening is not always a performance 
of the duty incumbent upon the traveler, for he must 
also exercise care to make the act of looking and 
listening reasonably effective, and must usually con-
tinue to be on the lookout and exercise his faculties 
until he has crossed * * * He must look and 
listen for all trains, and not merely for some trains, 
for he has no right to proceed upon the assumption 
that trains will cross only at specified times. He 
has, indeed, no right in any case to omit to take pre-
cautions for his own safety upon the supposition or 
assumption that he may safely cross the track." 
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See, also, for an announcement and application of the rule 
that mere looking is not always sufficient, but that the 
observation must be from a position where vision is not 
obscured, Drummond v. Union Pac. R. Co., 111 Utah 289, 
177 P. 2d 903; and Holmgren v. Union Pacific R. Co., 
Utah ... , 198 P. 2d 459. 
Nabrotzky v. Salt Lake & Utah Ry. Co., 103 Utah 274, 
135 P. 2d 115, was a case in which the facts. were quite 
similar to those under consideration. The plaintiff N a-
brotzky knew that there were flasher signals at a three-
, track crossing, and because they were not operating he as-
sumed that no train was approaching. As he proceeded 
over the crossing his vision was temporarily obscured by 
the glare from a nearby arc light. After holding, in line 
with Pippy v. Oregon Short Line R. Co., 79 Utah 439, 11 
P. 2d 305, that the plaintiff could not rely solely upon the 
flasher signals, the court decided the plaintiff was guilty 
of contributory negligence as a matter of law. The follow-
ing language from the court's opinion is particularly ap-
plicable in characterizing the plaintiff's conduct in our 
present case. 
"He (the plaintiff) was conscious of the rela-
tive location of the tracks which were 37 feet apart. 
He still had a duty to look in the directions from 
which he knew the trains approached, and he could 
neither plunge nor edge forward blindly into a 
known danger zone. He had a duty to keep a proper 
lookout for his safety and to avoid contact with 
trains which he knew operated over such tracks at 
frequent intervals. His view was unobstructed, and 
he could have seen except for the fact he was blinded 
momentarily and the further fact he did not bother 
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to look to the right or to the left. He sought to ex-
cuse his admitted negligence in traveling forward 
onto the track of defendant in a temporarily blinded 
condition, by saying he heard no bell and no whistle. 
In view of the fact the windows of his car were up, 
the ordinary operation noise of a 1933 model auto-
mobile, and the fact he did not direct his attention 
to any signal after he observed the flasher signal 
was not working, he might very well not have heard 
any sound from defendant's train. However, even 
assuming such want of care on the part of defendant 
as claimed by plaintiff, it did not excuse plaintiff's 
palpable negligence." 
To look when one's vision is obscured is no better than 
to fail to look at all. The plaintiff Seybold, after his first 
ineffective observation some 60 feet from the Passing 
Track, moved forward blindly into a known danger zone, 
without looking to right or to left. It is difficult to imagine 
a clearer case of negligence than for one to proceed blindly 
over a railroad crossing where a train might appear at any 
moment, without first ascertaining whether or not it is 
safe to do so. Assuming, as plaintiff in effect states, that 
the defendant temporarily obscured his vision with its loco-
motive headlight, still this did not excuse him from making 
effective observation along the Passing Track. Since he 
failed to look while traveling along Highway 91 at a time 
when the headlight would not interfere, it was his legal duty 
to choose a spot to make his observation along the Passing 
Track from which his observation could effectively be 
made. A motorist approaching a crossing is not required 
to choose the most advantageous position from which to 
make his observation, but if there is a position nearby 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
21 
from which an effective observation can be made the fact 
that the view is obscured from the place where he chooses 
to look gives him no license to proceed blindly forward . 
.. 
In Ulrikson v. Chicago, M. St. P. & P. Ry. Co., et al., 
64 S. D. 476, 268 N. W. 369, there were two tracks at the 
crossing where the accident occurred and these tracks were 
15 feet apart. The plaintiff, who was familiar with the 
crossing, looked down the main track when he was about 
75 to 80 feet from the passing track and 90 to 95 feet 
from the main line track. He observed no train approach 
at that time. When he was about 35 or 40 feet from the 
crossing, he again looked to the west, the direction from 
which the train approached, but a glare caused by the set-
ting sun prevented an effective observation. Nonetheless, 
he proceeded forward and the train was first observed just 
a moment before the impact. In holding the driver of the 
automobile was guilty of contributory negligence as a mat-
ter of law, the court stated as follows: 
"* * * So far as the driver is concerned, the 
general duty of care on approaching a railroad cross-
ing has been rendered specific at least to the extent 
that it is definitely established as the law of this 
state that 'it is the duty of an automobile driver ap-
proaching railroad tracks to look and listen where 
looking and listening will be effective, and that his 
failure to do so is contributory negligence as a mat-
ter of law.' (Citing cases.) 
"In the instant case the automobile driver was 
intimately acquainted with the crossing in question, 
having passed over it in the same direction, as he 
himself says, more than a thousand times. He knew 
that the view of the tracks to the west was obstructed 
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by buildings and that there was really very little 
vision to the west until the automobile reached a 
point about 100 feet north of the tracks and that 
from that point to the crossing visibility constantly 
increased. He knew that it was about the hour for 
the passage of a regular daily train from the west 
which did not stop at that crossing. He looked to 
the west at a time when he says he was protected 
from the glare of the sun by the Williams' house and 
at a point whence he estimated he could see along 
the track to the west about 130 feet. As a matter 
of fact, the visibility to the west from that point was 
probably nearer 190 feet. In any event, he did not 
see the train and in all probability it was not then 
within the range of his vision. From that point he 
continued on toward the track without any slacken-
ing of speed, and, while he states that he looked 
again to the west, he frankly concedes that when 
he did so the glare of the setting sun upon the win-
dows of the automobile so blinded him that he could 
see nothing. That such looking to the west was not 
an effective looking within the meaning of our de-
cisions is quite apparent. As stated by the Supreme 
Court of Washington in a case where the driver was 
blinded by an approaching headlight (Jaquith v. 
Worden (1913) 73 Wash. 349, 132 P. 33, 37, 48 L. 
R. A. (N. S.) 827), 'Had he been without eyes or 
had he closed them, he would have been in no worse 
position.' Nevertheless, with all the knowledge he 
had, knowing that his only view of the track to the 
west had been a short distance which he estimated 
at 130 feet, knowing that thereafter, although visi-
bility to the west increased, yet he could not see at 
all when he looked to the west because of the blind-
ing glare of the sun, this driver neither stopped his 
car nor slackened its speed, but proceeded blindly 
and heedlessly into the zone of danger. That he was 
contributorily negligent within the rule of former 
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decisions seems to us entirely clear. And such con-
tributory negligence is not excused by the fact 
(which we assume) that appellant railway company 
negligently failed to maintain proper lookout when 
approaching the crossing and negligently omitted to 
sound proper signals therefor * * *." 
In Lamely v. Baltimore & 0. S. W. R. Co., 298 F'. 916, 
there were three tracks at the crossing. Plaintiff stopped 
his truck about 10 feet from the nearest track and looked 
to the east, the direction from which a train approached on 
the middle track, but his view was obscured by railroad 
cars on the nearest track and by ties piled alongside the 
right of way. Nonetheless, he proceeded over the crossing 
and was struck by the train. We quote the opinion of the 
court, as follows : 
"* * * After attempting to make the obser-
vation, and being unable to do so, plaintiff 'took his 
chance' and drove across the track in front of an 
oncoming train. Giving full faith to plaintiff's ex-
planation of the reasons which actuated him, we are 
unable to find any question for the jury. Respecting 
the situation there is no confusion or uncertainty 
due to conflicting testimony. Plaintiff's duty might 
well be said to have been an absolute duty. It was 
not one which might or might not have been recog-
nized, due to the different views which different in-
dividuals might obtain from conflicting evidence. 
If plaintiff was under any obligation to ascertain 
at a highway crossing the coming of a train, we are 
satisfied he did not meet it. Not having looked when 
the view was unobstructed, he proceeded without as-
certaining a fact essential to his safe passage. 
"While he had a perfect right to travel the high-
way, the trains had the 'right of way' at the cross-
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ing. Ordinary care required that he ascertain, by 
the use of his various senses, whether trains were 
coming; and if he neglected to look when the view 
was clear, he should have ascertained the fact-not 
me·rely 'looked' when the view was obscured or ob-
structed * * * .'' 
The plaintiff could have, without much inconvenience 
to him, backed his truck a short distance to where an effec-
tive observation could have been made. By thus performing 
the duty which the law imposes upon him, that is, the duty 
of choosing a place from which an effective observation 
can be made if one is available, this. accident could have 
been avoided. If, then, we accept plaintiff's testimony in 
all respects insofar as that testimony created a jury ques-
tion, and if we analyze his conduct in the light of circum-
stances as thus revealed, we must conclude that the plain-
tiff was guilty of contributory negligence. 
The major portion of this brief has been devoted to 
a consideration of this view of the facts because we believe 
it is the only one that can logically be considered. To com-
plete this discussion, we now assume, however, that this 
view is not the proper one. We assume that the trial court 
was obligated to accept as true all of the plaintiff's nebu-
lous testimony and was further obligated to draw all rea-
sonable inferences therefrom favorable to the plaintiff. 
This is the second possibility mentioned in the first portion 
of this brief. 
C. Plaintiff was Guilty of Contributory Neg.ligence 
as a Matter of Law if all of the Evidence Offered by the 
Plaintiff is Accepted as True. 
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The only difference between this view of the evidence 
and the one just considered is that it is assumed, contrary 
to the undisputed evidence, that there were no lights on 
the defendant's caboose. V\' e assume also, of course, that 
the defendant's engine was about 75 feet from the cross-
ing; that none of defendant's employes were on the caboose; 
and, further, that there was no employe guarding the cross-
ing or warning the plaintiff by waving the lantern, or other-
wise. A consideration of the plaintiff's conduct under this 
evidence will lead to the same conclusion. 
The plaintiff testified he stopped his truck at the 
flasher signal; that he moved to the north up the Passing 
Track but the headlight was flashing across the crossing 
and he couldn't see anything; and he then drove his car 
to and over the Team Track over the 43 feet separating 
the Team Track and the Passing Track, and right up to 
and upon the Passing Track, keeping his eyes on the engine 
and the road ahead, and without making any further ob-
servation to determine if the Passing T'rack was clear. If 
the defendant's caboose was not lighted perhaps the plain-
tiff could not be expected to see it when he looked froin a 
position 60 feet west of the Passing Track. The fact re-
mains, however, that his own testimony discloses that his 
vision from that position was at least partially obscured by 
the engine headlight. Even though he could not be expected 
to see the caboose when he looked, the fact that he did not 
have a clear vision imposed upon him the duty of either 
moving hack out of the glare of the headlight or of pro-
ceeding cautiously toward the Passing 'frack, keeping his 
automobile under proper control, and making a further ob-
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servation near the track before moving onto it with his 
truck. The plaintiff testified he did not take any further 
precaution with respect to the Passing Track after his. first 
observation from a position back by the flasher signal. If 
the plaintiff after his ineffective observation had moved 
his truck back out of the glare of the crossing, he would 
have seen an unlighted caboose moving south along the 
Passing Track. The plaintiff testified that it wasn't very 
easy to see at the crossing and that it was quite dark. This 
statement does not conflict with the testimony of the de-
fendant's witness Anderson that the trackage area north 
of the crossing could be seen without difficulty from the 
town of Roberts at that time of night nor with the testi-
mony of the defendant's witness Tirre that from his. posi-· 
tion on the west side of Highway 91 it was. easy to see the 
Passing Track a moment before the collision. If the plain-
tiff did not want to move backward to a place where an 
unobscured observation could be made, he should at least 
have proceeded forward cautiously and made some obser-
vation when he was near the Passing Track. 
"* * * where one enters the tracks of a railroad, 
having complied with a fixed duty before entering, 
he is not relieved of the obligation to continue to 
look, and, if there is intervening space between the 
tracks where the driver may better see and hear, he 
is bound to stop, look, and listen quite as much as he 
was before entering on the first track." Frank v. 
Reading Co., 297 Pa. 233, 146 A. 598. 
We do not claim that the law in Utah required the plaintiff 
to stop before reaching the Passing Track, but it did re-
quire him to keep his automobile under control and, since 
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he could not be sure whether there was a train on that 
track or not, to make some further observation from a 
point near the track. See Drummond v. Union Pac. R. Co., 
111 Utah 289, 177 P. 2d 903. There are many cases which 
hold that a motorist must do more than merely look and 
listen as he approaches the crossing but must be vigilant 
every moment he is upon the crossing and that if the view 
of any one of the tracks at the crossing is obscured the 
motorist must approach that track cautiously and make 
observation from a point near the track before proceeding 
over it. See Witkowski v. Lehigh Valley R. Co., 338 Pa. 
510, 12 A. 2d 980; Scott v. Kurn, et al., 343 Mo. 1210, 126 
S. W. 2d 185; Beckwith v. Spokane International Ry. Co., 
120 Wash. 91, 206 P. 921; Rule v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. 
Co., 107 Kan. 479, 192 P. 729; Grimsley v. Northern Pac. Ry. 
Co., 187 F. 587; Ramsey v. Baltimore & 0. R. Co., 336 Pa. 
498, 9 A. 2d 348. There was a space of approximately 60 
feet between the place where he made his ineffective ob-
servation and the point of the accident; there was a space 
of 43 feet after he passed over the Team Track within 
which he could have kept his truck under control and made 
some observation along the Passing Track. This he did not 
choose to do but relied, instead, upon a previous observa-
tion which he knew afforded him no reasonable assurance 
of safety. It is now plain that if the plaintiff had taken 
this ordinary, reasonable precaution he could have and 
would have seen the approaching caboose. This is abso-
lutely demonstrated by the fact that he actually did see 
it, lighted or not, when he was at or near the Passing 
Track, even though he was neither looking for it nor pay-
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ing any attention at all to the track. The conclusion is in-
escapable, even accepting all of the plaintiff's testimony, 
that he could have made an effective observation immed-
iately before driving on to the Passing Track and that he 
failed to do so. All of the cases we have been able to find 
and which we cited herein define such conduct as negli-
gence as a matter of law. Consequently, it matters not 
what view is taken of the facts of the accident as disclosed 
by the evidence. All paths lead to the same conclusion: 
Plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence as a matter 
of law. 
D. There was no Excuse for the Plaintiff's Negli-
gence. 
Counsel for the plaintiff seek to excuse plaintiff's 
heedless conduct by stating he was confused and apprehen-
sive of da-nger from the stationary switch engine on the 
main track north of the crossing. In support of this posi-
tion they cite Newton v. Oregon Short Line R. Co., 43 Utah 
219, 134 P. 567, and Malizia v. _Oregon Short Line R. Co., 
53 Utah 122, 178 P. 756. The facts of this case do not 
bring it within the rule as announced in the Newton and 
Malizia cases. That rule is explained in Jensen v. Oregon 
Short Line R·. Co., supra, as follows: 
"The controlling fact * * * is that the per-
son attempting to cross or use the street was at the 
time of the accident apparently or actually con-
fronted with a 'multiplicity of dangers' which tended 
to confuse, mislead or disconcert the mind to such 
an extent as to leave the matter of contributory neg-
ligence in doubt." 
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The plaintiff was neither confused by nor reasonably ap-
prehensive of personal danger from the stationary steam 
engine. He observed that this engine was not moving. 
While it is true he could not rely upon its not moving to-
ward the crossing, still it did not interfere with or prevent 
a safe movement over either the Team Track or the Pass-
ing Track. The Main Track upon which the engine was 
standing was 60 feet from the Team Track and 17 feet from 
the Passing Track. Plaintiff testified that he knew the 
engine was on the Main Track, and he knew there were 
two other nearer tracks at the crossing. He knew that the 
engine was not a source of immediate danger to him while 
moving over either of the two nearer tracks. It was neither 
reasonable nor excusable that he should ignore the im-
mediate potential danger from movements on the tracks 
he was approaching in order to ·concentrate on an immobile 
engine some distance north of the crossing on the last track 
he was to cross. The "multiplicity of dangers" rule is a 
good, humanitarian one when properly applied. It should 
be limited, however, to a situation where the plaintiff is 
actually and reasonably confused or apprehensive of im-
mediate danger from other sources. It should not be used 
as a sanction for heedless conduct where no actual or ap-
parent multiplicity of dangers exists. An overextension of 
the doctrine would destroy the balance which it creates. 
The words of the court in Wilkinson v. Oregon Short Line 
R. Co., 35 Utah 110, 99 P. 466, are, we think, particularly 
appropriate. 
"* * * If it ordinarily constitutes negli-
gence to disregard a duty imposed by law, there is 
no reason why the one who fails to discharge the 
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duty shall not bear the consequences of his own act 
in so far at least as those consequences affect him, 
unless the law affords him some excuse for omitting 
to perform the duty imposed. The rule was not con-
ceived for the purpose of shielding either the trav-
eler or the railroad company. The company must for 
its negligence respond to all who may be innocently 
inj ur~d by a collision at a crossing as well as bear 
the injury to its property. The only immunity it 
obtains is against the traveler who, by his own care-
less act, brought on or directly contributed to his 
own injuries, and the traveler is equally immune 
against the conduct by the company for any injury 
it may have sustained by a collision where the trav-
eler and the company omitted an act required by law 
or failed to exercise due care. In such event, in the 
eye· of the law, the parties are in equal fault, and 
hence will not be heard to complain of the concurring 
acts of negligence as against each other. Under 
the evidence in this case, no court would hesitate 
to pronounce the act of the railroad company in not 
giving any warning in approaching the crossing as 
constituting negligence as a matter of law. By the 
same token, the law ought not to shield the traveler 
who omitted to perform a duty imposed upon him 
for his own safety by the same law, and for which 
omission he tenders no legal excuse. If the case 
were one where the question was merely whether 
ordinary care was or was not exercised in view of 
all the circumstances, we would have no hesitancy 
in leaving the questions of both negligence and con-
tributory negligence to the jury. This is not such 
a case, however. It is. a case where the law itself 
declares that the omission to do a certain thing 
constitutes negligence. In such a case we have no 
right, whatever may be our desire, to cast the duty 
we ought to discharge upon others. In such a case 
the jury could, at most, excuse either the one or the 
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other of the negligent parties from the consequences 
of his concurring acts of negligence. This, in view 
of the great danger incident to collisions on public 
crossings, the law does not sanction, but requires 
the court to pronounce judgment when the facts are 
undisputed or conceded that the party complaining 
is himself in fault. If once the rule be relaxed so as 
to permit the traveler to say that there were other 
things which diverted his attention, and for that 
reason he did not look or listen when such things in 
no way were threatening his personal safety, then 
the rule may as well be abrogated, and the whole 
matter be left to the jury in all crossing accidents, as 
is done in other cases of injury through negligence. 
We think where the evidence is clear, as in this case, 
the rule is a wholesome one, and ought not to be 
weakened by unsubstantial distinctions * * * ." 
When all the distinctions and excuses raised by counsel 
for the plaintiff are viewed in the proper perspective, the 
fact remains free from substantial doubt that the plaintiff 
heedlessly drove his truck over the crossing. The only in-
ferences that can be drawn from the evidence are that he 
failed to look down the Passing Track at all, or that he 
looked but failed to see what was to be seen, or, finally, 
that he looked but failed to see the approaching caboose 
because his vision was impaired and, yet, blindly took a 
chance. He claims to have looked but to have seen nothing 
because of the fact that the headlight obscured his view. 
If true, this gave no license to assume that all was clear. 
After such ineffective observation he should not have trav-
eled the remaining 60 feet to the Passing Track without 
looking to the north or to the south along that track. In 
so doing, he breached the positive duty imposed l).pon him 
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by law and was guilty of negligent conduct which proxi-
mately contributed to cause this accident. · The plaintiff 
cannot complain that the trial court refused to let the case 
rest with the jury because his own testimony demonstrated 
his contributory negligence and removed any substantial 
doubt as to the defendant's non-liability. 
CONC.LUSION 
The judgment which the court rendered against the 
plaintiff was proper and should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
BRYAN P. LEVERICH, 
M. J. BRONSON, 
A. U. MINER, 
HOWARD F. CORAY, 
D. A. ALSUP, 
Attorneys for Defendant 
and Respondent. 
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